Abstract-Packaging software into containers is becoming a common practice when deploying services in cloud and other environments. Docker images are one of the most popular container technologies for building and deploying containers. A container image usually includes a collection of software packages, that can have bugs and security vulnerabilities that affect the container health. Our goal is to support container deployers by analysing the relation between outdated containers and vulnerable and buggy packages installed in them. We use the concept of technical lag of a container as the difference between a given container and the most up-to-date container that is possible with the most recent releases of the same collection of packages. For 7,380 official and community Docker images that are based on the Debian Linux distribution, we identify which software packages are installed in them and measure their technical lag in terms of version updates, security vulnerabilities and bugs. We have found, among others, that no release is devoid of vulnerabilities, so deployers cannot avoid vulnerabilities even if they deploy the most recent packages. We offer some lessons learned for container developers in regard to the strategies they can follow to minimize the number of vulnerabilities. We argue that Docker container scan and security management tools should improve their platforms by adding data about other kinds of bugs and include the measurement of technical lag to offer deployers information of when to update.
I. INTRODUCTION
Packaging software into containers has become a common practice during the last years [2] . In particular, Docker containers are a popular schema to provision multiple software applications on a single host. A container is a running image, which includes its own system libraries, configuration files, and software [17] , providing support for both Linux-based and other operating systems [18] , [24] . Docker allows for the creation of registries, providing a common place to share Docker images. With more than 1.6M images (October 2018), Docker Hub is one of the largest of such registries.
Images in Docker Hub are organized in repositories, each one providing a set of versioned Docker images. Repositories can be private or public, which in turn are split into official and community repositories. An official repository contains public and certified images from recognized vendors (e.g., ElasticSearch, Debian, Alpine). Images in official repositories are frequently used as the base for other Docker images, since they A preliminary version of this paper was published on arXiv [19] are supposed to be secure and well maintained. Community repositories can be created by any user or organization [4] .
When Docker images are built with Linux-based operating systems, they usually follow the packaging model for their Linux distribution of choice, with most of the software they include installed as a package. Once the image is built, packages remain frozen (for a certain version of that image). From time to time, a new version of the image is built, with a newer version of the packages. But the old version may be still in use, deployed as a container in production. Those containers corresponding to old images may include outdated packages with known security vulnerabilities and bugs, already fixed in newer versions but still present in them. Since the containers may run in production, they could be exposed to exploits of those vulnerabilities, and problems due to those bugs.
On the other hand, deployers of containers may prefer to stick to old versions, because they are known to work well and have been tested in production for a long time. In fact, reproducibility is one of the main characteristics of Docker containers, in the sense that using container images provides isolation from evolving dependencies and changes in packages that may break working systems. This is a strong incentive to stick to an outdated image because it "just works", since upgrading to new versions of container images always involves some risk. Thus, deployers are always balancing their need to update to new images with vulnerability and bug fixes, and the risk of breaking a working system due to unexpected changes in the upgraded packages.
This compromise has been widely reported in literature. According to a 2015 survey by Red Hat and Forrester [3] , security is a top concern when deciding whether to deploy containers. A 2016 survey by DevOps.com and RedMonk [9] revealed that users who are more concerned by image security focused on scanning simple Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) on the operating system. A 2017 survey by Anchore.io focused on the landscape of practices being deployed by container users [1] . One of the questions was: "Other than security, what are the other checks that you perform before running application containers?" The top answers related to software package were: required packages (∼ 40% of the answers); presence of bugs in major third-party software (∼ 33%); and verifying whether third party software versions are up-to-date (∼ 27%).
To support deployers of containers in this everyday com-promise, we propose a method to assess on how outdated, vulnerable, and buggy Docker images are with respect to the latest available releases of the packages they include. The method is based on the concept of technical lag [12] , which we use to estimate the difference between the software deployed in production and the most recent version of this software (in our case, in terms of novelty, vulnerabilities and bugs). To show the applicability of the approach, we conduct an empirical study, measuring technical lag, security vulnerabilities and bugs for 2, 453 official and 4, 927 community Docker Hub images based on the Debian Linux distribution. The research questions that we address in this study are: II. RELATED WORK González-Barahona et al. [12] proposed a theoretical model of "technical lag" to measure how outdated software components are. They explored many ways in which technical lag can be measured, and presented specific cases for which it is useful to analyze the evolution of technical lag.
Kula et al. [14] studied the impact of dependency updates in the GitHub ecosystem. They empirically studied library migration of a set of 4,600 GitHub repositories and 2,700 library dependencies, and found that 81.5% of the studied projects keep their outdated dependencies. Surveying developers about this, they found that 69% of the interviewees were unaware of these outdated dependencies. Zerouali et al. [26] introduced and analyzed a technical lag metric for dependencies in package networks, in order to assess how outdated a software package is compared to the latest available releases of its dependencies. Considering JavaScript packages as a case study, they found a strong presence of technical lag caused by the specific use of dependency constraints. Decan et al. [7] found similar results. Cox et al. [6] analyzed 75 software systems and introduced different metrics to quantify their use of recent versions of dependencies. They found that systems using outdated dependencies were four times more likely to have security issues than up-to-date systems.
Focusing on Docker images, Cito et al. [5] conducted an empirical study on a dataset of 70,000 Dockerfiles, and contrasted this general population with samplings containing the top 100 and top 1,000 most popular projects using Docker. Their goal was to characterize the Docker ecosystem, discover prevalent quality issues, and study the evolution of Docker images. Among other results, they found that the most popular projects change more often than the rest of the Docker population, with an average of 5.81 revisions per year and 5 lines of code changed. Furthermore, they found that, from a representative sample of 560 projects, 34% of all Docker images could not be built.
Shu et al. [23] performed a generic large scale study on the state of security vulnerabilities in both community and official Docker Hub repositories. They proposed the Docker Image Vulnerability Analysis (DIVA) framework to automatically discover, download, and analyze Docker images for security vulnerabilities. They studied a set of 356,218 images and observed that both official and community repositories contain on average more than 180 vulnerabilities; many images had not been updated for hundreds of days, demonstrating a strong need for more analysis and systematic methods of studying the content of Docker containers.
In our work, we only consider unique images, since we found many duplicate images inside the same repository. Additionally, we study in more detail the relation between package security vulnerabilities and technical lag of outdated packages. Moreover, and to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study and report results about non-security-related package bugs in Docker containers.
III. METHOD AND DATA EXTRACTION
Our study is based on pulling Docker images from Docker Hub, identifying which packages are installed in them, and computing the technical lag for the image by aggregating the technical lag of those packages. We will measure the technical lag of individual packages in terms of version updates, vulnerabilities, and bugs. Our initial sample is composed of all official images in Docker Hub which are based on Debian, and the most pulled images based on Debian. Therefore, we only need to compute technical lag for Debian packages.
The overall process, which we describe in detail below, is: (1) identification of Docker Hub base images for Debian, defining our base set; (2) identification of Docker Hub images in our dataset, including those derived from the base set; (3) analysis of all those images, matching their packages to a historical archive of all Debian packages; and (4) identification of bug and vulnerability reports for those packages, based on a historical database with those details for Debian packages. Figure 1 shows how we used the main data sources for our study. The next subsections explain in detail how we gathered the used datasets.
A replication package for our study is available for download at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2350504. 
Data Extraction

Container images
A. Base Images for Debian
We decided to work with Docker images based on a Linuxdistribution, because applications in them are usually installed using well-defined packages. Among them, we selected Debian because of its maturity and widespread use 1 in Docker Hub. On October 1 st 2018, the Debian repository on Docker Hub had more than 125M pulls 2 . While it is possible to create Docker images from scratch, most of them are based on others, which in the end are built on base images that do not rely on any other image, except for the Docker-reserved minimal image named "scratch" 3 . Since we want to deal with images based in Debian, we first identified Debian base images 4 . The Debian project maintains packages for several simultaneous release lines (Debian distributions) [11] . 
B. Identifying Analyzed Images
Images in Docker Hub are named with the name of the repository, followed by a colon, and a tag ("imageRepo:Tag"). Any image can be tagged more than once, and therefore may have more than one name (e.g., "debian:testing", "debian:testing-20181011"). In the case of community images, the name of the repository usually starts with the name of the organization producing the images: "organizationName/ImageName". Therefore, full image names tend to have the form "organizationName/ImageName:Tag".
Each Therefore, we can identify Docker images derived from Debian base images by checking if they contain their layers. Using the Docker Hub API we extracted all available image names from the 124 official repositories, and those with at least 500 pulls from the top 30,000 community repositories (by number of pulls). Using the skopeo tool 6 we inspected images corresponding to all those image names, identifying unique images, and finding which ones included layers from our set of Debian base images. From 14,653 image names in official repositories, we found 2,453 unique images (i.e., 4,769 names) based on our set of Debian images. From 30,000 community repositories, we found 4,927 unique images derived form our Debian set. All of them together composed our dataset of 7,380 images. Table II shows the number of images found for each Debian version. C. Identifying Installed Packages Docker containers based in Debian include specific versions of Debian binary packages. Binary packages are produced from source packages, which we need to identify because we use them to find vulnerabilities and bug reports.
For tracking binary packages, and finding their metadata (including the name and version of the source package from which they were produced), we extracted daily snapshots of all amd64 binary packages for Oldstable (Jessie), Stable (Stretch) and Testing (Buster) distributions from the official and security Debian Snapshot repositories 7 . Then, we pulled each Docker image in our images dataset, and identified its packages using regular Debian tools (dpkg -l). We matched them to our dataset obtained from Debian Snapshot, finding in it more than 99% of the packages in our images (1,379,163 package versions in official images, and 561,982 in community images). We found a median number of 190 and 261 installed packages in official and community images, respectively.
D. Vulnerability Reports
To find out known security vulnerabilities for the Debian packages in our dataset of Docker images, we used the Debian Security Bug Tracker 8 as of 2018-03-18. For each package, the status of known vulnerabilities is maintained by the Debian Security Team, using data from different data sources (CVE database 9 , National Vulnerability Database "NVD" 10 , etc). In this Debian tracker, information about vulnerabilities is maintained at the source package level. A Debian vulnerability report contains information about affected source packages, severity, status, Debian bug id (if available), affected distributions, fixed version (if available), etc. Using it we can link vulnerabilities to source packages, and from there (using the Debian Snapshot dataset) to binary packages in our container images of interest. For each reported vulnerability for a package present in one of the analyzed images, we say that the corresponding package version is vulnerable if the vulnerability is still open, or the vulnerability has been fixed in a more recent version than the one installed in the image.
E. Bug Reports
For bug reports, we used the Ultimate Debian Database 11 , querying for known bugs for the packages installed in our container images. UDD is a continuously updated system that gathers various Debian data in the same SQL database [20] : bugs, packages, upload history, maintainers, etc.
UDD contains information about all bug reports, including those that were archived. To identify if a package version is "buggy", we queried UDD for all bug reports for that package. For each reported bug we checked if the specific package version was higher or equal to the version where the bug was first found. In case the bug report is resolved, we also verified if the package version is lower than the one fixing the bug.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS RESULTS RQ 0 : How often are Docker images updated?
In order to analyze the technical lag of Docker container packages, it is essential to know how often Docker maintainers update their images and when they were last updated, since old images that have not been updated in a long time may have more outdated packages. This allows us to have a better understanding and carry out a fair comparison between the content of the different containers.
In September 2017, Anchore.io analyzed the official Docker images update history 12 and found that operating system images like Debian, Alpine or Ubuntu update less often than non-OS images like Redis, MySQL or Postgres. They also noticed that Debian images are updated every month, which is the average compared to other OS images. Moreover, they observed that on some days many repositories push updates at the same time. Investigating this phenomenon, they found that in many cases this occurs the day after their base image debian:latest was updated. Figure 2 shows the years when the considered Docker images were last updated. We observe that the number of official images that were updated in 2018 is less than those that were updated in 2017, for the images that make use of the Oldstable version Jessie (Debian 8), while it is the opposite for the community images. Another important observation that should be taken into account for the rest of the study is that 48% of the community images and 66% of the official images were last updated before 2018. This can be explained by the number of images per repository: while official repositories have many images with different operating systems (i.e., including slim and full) and for different architectures, community repositories have predominantly only one unique image (latest) with different tags. Thus, in official repositories new images emerge while others stop being updated; and community repositories tend to keep updating their images without creating new ones. RQ 1 investigates how outdated the packages in Docker containers are, based on a quantification of their technical lag. Therefore, we start by exploring how many packages within containers are up-to-date (i.e., having the latest available fix). Figure 3 shows the proportion of up-to-date and outdated packages in both official and community Docker containers, grouped by their Debian version. We observe that, regardless of the Debian version, most packages are up-to-date. The median proportion of up-to-date packages per container is 82% of all installed packages. We also notice that packages inside community containers are slightly more up-to-date (median 85%) than packages inside official containers (median 78%).
We statistically confirm this observation using a nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test that does not assume normality of the data. The null hypothesis assumes that the up-to-date package distributions of the community and official containers, grouped by their Debian version, are identical. For each pair of groups (Official-Jessie, Community-Jessie), (Official-Stretch, Community-Stretch), and (Official-Buster, Community-Buster), we rejected H 0 with statistical significance (p < 0.01) when comparing the up-to-date package distributions of two groups of containers. However, for each comparison, we only found a small effect size (|d| ≤ 0.28) using Cliff's Delta, a nonparametric measure quantifying the difference between two groups of observations. When restricting our analysis to recent images only (i.e., those that were last updated in 2018), we found that packages in official containers are slightly more up-to-date than packages in community containers. Since community images are based on official images, this means that from all available official images, Docker community deployers tend to use the most recently updated ones, or they manually update all outdated packages inherited from old official images. We also found that the median proportion of up-to-date packages per container, in all cases, increased to 98% of all installed packages. To quantify how outdated packages are, we compute their technical lag. According to [26] , it can be measured as the delta between the used package version and the latest available version. Since Debian maintainers are supporting three releases (Jessie, Stretch and Buster), we measure the technical lag in terms of the number of versions available between the used and the latest available version from the same Debian release. For instance, suppose that a used package q of container c has the following series of versions in Debian For all containers, we measured the technical lag of their outdated packages. Figure 4 shows the technical lag in terms of versions for the outdated packages in Docker containers, grouped by their Debian version. At first sight, we observe that the distributions are highly skewed. However, the distribution for the containers using Stretch is more highly skewed than the others. Table III shows that the median version lag for both Jessie and Stretch containers is 1, while it is 2 versions for Buster. This small difference is related to the state of the Debian release. Because Buster is now in the Testing phase, many containers prefer not to depend on its packages since they are still subject to many changes, making it hard to keep up with its updating process. However, we can conclude that, in general, packages in Docker containers are either up-to-date or lagging behind with a median of 1 to 2 versions. Since we found that the proportion of up-to-date installed packages per container is high, we decided to investigate more about the used package versions and when they were created. Considering only the up-to-date package versions this time, we traced back the date when they were first seen in Debian. We found that most of the package versions are old. Moreover, we found that exactly 80% of the used Stretch package versions and 90% of the Jessie package versions were created before 2017-06-18, the release date of the Stable version of Stretch. We also found that 63% of the used Jessie package versions were created before the release date of the Stable version of Jessie (i.e., 2015-04-25). This means that used packages tend to remain up-to-date because of the way in which Debian maintainers are creating and updating their packages. 
We found that only 12.2% (i.e., 488 out of 3,975) of all unique installed packages (from both official and community containers) had security issues. Figure 5 shows the distribution of vulnerabilities by their severity (not assigned, unimportant, low, medium or high) and status (open, resolved and undetermined). We found that 49.9% (i.e., 12,806) of all vulnerabilities are resolved, while 48.6% (i.e., 12,479) are still open. A small proportion of 1.6% (i.e., 401) are undetermined. We also observe that the majority of vulnerabilities has a medium (37.2%), unimportant (20.2%) or high (18.3%) severity. However, we found that all containers are affected by these severity vulnerabilities. In fact, 96% of all containers are affected by all types of vulnerabilities, except for the not assigned vulnerabilities. This possibly means that this small proportion of 12.2% of packages causes the vulnerability of nearly all Docker containers. Next, we computed the number of vulnerabilities per container. We obtained a mean value of 1,336 vulnerabilities and a median of 601. The important difference between mean and median signals a heavily skewed distribution. Indeed, we found one container with as much as 7,338 vulnerabilities. Using a Mann-Whitney U test we found statistically significant differences (p < 0.01) in the number of vulnerabilities per container between official and community distributions. However, the effect size was small (|d| < 0.3). Table IV shows more details about the distribution of the number of vulnerabilities in Docker containers. To study the relation between the outdated container packages and the vulnerability of the container, we compared the number of outdated packages and number of vulnerabilities per container. Considering both official and community containers, and without differentiating between vulnerabilities by severity or status, we plot the numbers in a scatter plot for different Debian versions (Figure 6 ). We visually observe a certain relationship between both metrics, especially for the Jessie containers: when the number of outdated packages increases, the number of vulnerabilities tends to increase as well. To verify our observations, we calculated Pearson's correlation coefficient R and Spearman's ρ over all packages, using the following thresholds : 0 < very weak ≤ 0.2 < weak ≤ 0.4 < moderate ≤ 0.6 < moderately strong ≤ 0.8 < strong ≤ 1. A moderately strong increasing correlation (0.6 < R ≤ 0.8 and 0.6 < ρ ≤ 0.8) for Jessie and Buster, and only a moderate one for Stretch (R = 0.53 and ρ = 0.42) exists.
If we consider that the need for updating an outdated package only arises when a fix for a known vulnerability is available, it is preferable to focus on the category of resolved vulnerabilities. We found a mean value of 347 resolved vulnerabilities per container, and a median value of 102. Repeating the above correlation analysis reveals a strong correlation between the number of resolved vulnerabilities and the number of outdated packages (0.8 < R ≤ 0.9 and ρ > 0.9). Table V shows the top 5 vulnerable official and community images with their number of vulnerabilities (i.e., #vulns), number of installed packages (i.e., #pkgs) and age. For the official images, only the top vulnerable image in a repository is presented. For example, the perl repository has many images with a high number of vulnerabilities; summed together, perl would be in the top 5. However, since these images provide the same functionality, we report only one: the most vulnerable image. A common characteristic about the top vulnerable containers is that they have not been updated for more than two years, and their number of installed packages is higher than the median over all containers. Thus, it is not surprising that these containers have high number of severity vulnerabilities. Table VI shows the top 5 most and least vulnerable source packages, with their number of vulnerabilities and the proportion of containers that make use of them. The three most vulnerable source packages linux, chromium-browser and imagemagick seem to have high number of binary packages: 433, 419 and 327, respectively. We did not observe any significant relation between the number of binary packages and the number of vulnerabilities. For instance, the source packages mono and libreoffice have 241 and 195 binary packages, but they have only 1 and 9 vulnerabilities, respectively. We also found some vulnerable packages (e.g., audit and bzip2) that are used by all containers, explaining why nearly all containers are affected by vulnerable packages. · The number of outdated packages in a container is strongly correlated to the number of resolved vulnerabilities.
To which extent do containers suffer from bugs in packages?
The question concerns the presence of non-security-related bugs in Docker container packages, and the relation between bugs and outdated packages. Considering all packages for both community and official images, we found that 50.1% (1,994 out of 3,975) of all unique installed source packages have bugs.
We also discovered that all containers have "buggy" packages. Figure 7 shows the distribution of bugs grouped by status (pending, forwarded, fixed) and severity (wishlist, minor, normal, important, high). The high category combined three different severity types: serious, grave and critical. We found that 65.5% (12, 863 ) of all bugs are still pending, 7.3% (3, 460) are forwarded and only 27.2% (30,922) are fixed. With respect to the severity, only 2.9% of all bugs are high, 27.7% are important, 50.2% are normal and the rest is minor or still in the wishlist. Since the majority of bugs are still pending -nearly two out of three package bugs (65.5%) are without a fix, and one out of two packages (50.1%) has a bug-we would expect the number of bugs per container to be higher than the number of vulnerabilities. Including both official and community containers, we found a mean value of 2,081 and a median value of 2,163 bugs per container. Focusing on fixed bugs only, we found a mean value of 678 and a median value of 729 fixed bugs per container. While these numbers may appear high, this is normal for Debian, that typically has thousands of open bugs at any point in time.
When comparing the number of bugs in official and community containers, we obtained a statistically significant difference (p < 0.01) using the Mann-Whitney U test. The effect size was small (|d| < 0.2) for Buster and Stretch, and medium (|d| = 0.28) for Jessie. The number of reported bugs decreases with more recent versions of Debian. Table VII shows details about the distribution of the number of bugs in Docker containers. We also studied the relation between the presence of outdated packages and bugs in containers. Considering both official and community containers, and without differentiating between bug status or severity, Figure 8 shows a scatter plot, for different Debian versions, of the relation between the number of outdated packages and the number of bugs found in each container. Opposite to what we observed for vulnerabilities in Figure 6 , there only appears to be a relation between the number of bugs and number of outdated packages for Buster.
To statistically verify our observations, we computed Pearson's R and Spearman's ρ correlation for all packages. For Since nearly half of all vulnerabilities are still open and 65% of all bugs are still pending, this question investigates how long it takes for a bug to get fixed. To do so, for all bugs, we compute the time interval between the bug report creation date and the last modification date of the bug, considering that this corresponds to the bug fix date, in case a fix was observed.
We rely on the statistical technique of survival analysis based on the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier statistic estimator commonly used to estimate survival functions [10] (widely used before in software engineering research [16] , [21] , [22] ). Figure 9 shows survival curves per severity level for the event "bug is fixed" w.r.t. the bug report creation date. We observe that the time to fix a bug does not always depend on its severity level. High severity bugs are fixed faster than other kind of bugs. For example, it takes 53.8 and 33.5 months so that 50% of all normal and minor bugs get fixed, respectively, while it only takes 3 months for high severity bugs. Debian maintainers prefer to start with easy bugs that are trivial to fix rather than normal ones. Nonetheless, bugs that may have an impact on releasing the package with the Stable release of Debian (i.e., high severity 13 ) have the highest priority. To find out if there are statistically significant differences between the survival curves per severity, we carried out 13 https://www.debian.org/Bugs/Developer.en.html\#severities log-rank tests for each severity pair. The differences were statistically confirmed (p < 0.01 after Bonferroni correction) except for the pairs (normal, important) and (minor, wishlist) where the null hypothesis could not be rejected. Fig. 9 . Survival probability for event "bug is fixed" w.r.t. the bug report creation date.
Findings: Normal and minor bugs require in the median very long time to be fixed (53.8 and 33.5 months). High severity bugs are fixed ten times faster than other kind of bugs.
Similar to the bug survival analysis, we analyzed the survival of security vulnerabilities over time. Using the Debian security tracker we extracted the debianbug id for each vulnerability. With this id, we searched in the UDD for the creation and last modification date of the corresponding bug. We only found 62% of all vulnerabilities with a corresponding debianbug id. This proportion of vulnerabilities is responsible for 93% of all container vulnerabilities. For this subset we carried out a survival analysis for the event "security vulnerability is fixed" w.r.t. the bug report creation date. Figure 10 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curves for each severity level found on the security tracker (as opposed to the severity of the bug reported in the UDD). We observe that vulnerabilities are fixed faster than other types of bugs. It takes 5.9 months for not assigned severity vulnerabilities, 2.4 months for medium severity vulnerabilities, and 2.1 months for high severity vulnerabilities. Low severity vulnerabilities take much more time to fix: 27 months to fix 50% of them. We could not include the unimportant vulnerabilities since only 0.5% of them are fixed. We carried out log-rank tests to compare whether there are statistically significant differences between the survival curves depending on the severity of the bug. We could reject the null hypothesis assuming the similarity between the survival analysis curves with statistical significance (p < 0.01 after Bonferroni correction), except for high and medium severity vulnerabilities.
The findings concerning the unimportant vulnerabilities could be understandable since those vulnerabilities do not affect the binary package, but only materials and files that are not built (e.g., doc/foo/examples/ 14 ). To investigate this further, we identified the bug severity of the low severity vulnerabilities inside the Debian bug tracker (i.e., from the UDD), and found that 77.5% of these vulnerabilities have an important or normal bug severity. This correlates with the previous findings in RQ 4 and explains the results for the low vulnerabilities. However, we also observed that 51% of the high severity vulnerabilities are labeled as important bugs and 45% of them are considered as high (i.e., serious, grave or critical) bugs. This means that an upstream high vulnerable package can have a different priority downstream, depending on the downstream maintainers assessment (i.e., how a package is compiled, how it is integrated into the distribution, etc.).
Findings: High and medium severity vulnerabilities are fixed faster than low severity vulnerabilities. Vulnerability reports upstream might have different severity downstream.
V. DISCUSSION AND ACTIONABLE RESULTS
If containers would always depend on the most recent available version of their used packages, they would benefit from the latest functionality, security updates and bug fixes. However, maintainers might be more focused on other software characteristics such as package stability, or they just choose not to upgrade certain packages because of the considerable effort that may be involved in doing so ("if it ain't broke, don't fix it"). For this reason, we studied the presence of technical lag in Docker containers, and related it to the presence of bugs and severity vulnerabilities.
In RQ 1 , we found that, in general, Debian packages used in stable releases are old and up-to-date (i.e., having the latest available fix). This implies that it should be easy for developers to keep up with the Debian updating process, since package maintainers are not releasing often. Moreover, new package versions in the Stable and Oldstable releases are only about security patches, so from a semantic versioning point of view, there is little to fear of breaking changes. For the Testing release, however, things are different: deployers should be aware about how the Debian project works.
Actionable result: Container deployers should be aware that the optimal update frequency of their base images and installed packages depends on the base Debian version.
In RQ 2 , we found that the number of vulnerabilities is related to the number of outdated packages per Debian-based container. This demonstrates that containers could benefit from better updating procedures, allowing them to avoid security issues coming from their installed packages. Moreover, we 14 https://security-team.debian.org/security tracker.html found that the number of vulnerabilities is related to the Debian release. In RQ 3 , we found that all Docker containers are vulnerable and contain packages with a high number of vulnerabilities and bugs. Since we did not discover a high version lag in containers, we do not think it is the responsibility of Docker deployers to avoid all vulnerabilities. Even containers with up-to-date packages still may have a high number of vulnerabilities. Lesson learned: No release is devoid of vulnerabilities, so deployers cannot avoid them even if they deploy the most recent packages.
We could not find a significant relation between the number of outdated packages and the number of bugs. However, we observed that the number of bugs is related primarily to the Debian release. This means that deployers that care about bugs and new functionality and not about stability, should definitely upgrade to the Debian Testing release, since the updates in Stable and Oldstable releases are primarily about security bugs (i.e., severity vulnerabilities). Actionable result: Container deployers concerned with having as few non-security bugs as possible should upgrade to the Testing release, at the expense of having a lower package stability.
Based on a survival analysis, we concluded that security vulnerabilities take less time to fix than other kind of bugs. The relation between vulnerabilities, bugs and outdated packages shows that container deployers should give a high priority to updating when checking their container packages. Actionable result: High security bugs are first priority for Debian maintainers; they are fixed faster than other kind of bugs. Container deployers should be aware of the newly available versions of their installed packages and keep technical lag to the minimum to avoid this type of bugs.
Comparing our results about vulnerabilities to previous observations [23] , we found Debian-based Docker containers to have an average number of vulnerabilities (i.e., 460) that is above the average for all Docker containers (i.e., 120). However, the number of vulnerabilities depends on the number of installed packages found. For example, it is not fair to compare vulnerabilities between Debian containers and Alpine 15 containers, unless we compare their size as well (in terms of number of installed packages).
As highlighted before, it is important to verify not only vulnerabilities, but also other bugs. Indeed, bugs make the system behave in unexpected ways, resulting in faults, wrong functionality or reduced performance. Researchers already found that performance bugs are similar to security bugs, in that they require more experienced developers to fix them [25] . Hence, it is essential to include bug analysis tools into existing automated scan and security management services such as Anchore.io or Quay.io.
Moreover, an Anchore.io survey showed that container deployers care more about package vulnerabilities than having packages up-to-date. However, we found that less outdated containers have less vulnerabilities. Thus, we believe that including the technical lag as a measure of how outdated packages are, can empower automated scan and security management tools to give better insights about the security of Docker containers. Actionable result: Docker scan and security management tools should improve their platforms by adding data about other kind of bugs and include the measurement of technical lag to offer deployers information of when to update.
Using our automated data extraction tool, container deployers can check the state of their container Debian package vulnerabilities and bugs. They can also compare with other containers that make use of the Debian operating system.
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY
Our study was focused on Docker containers that make use of the Testing, Stable or Oldstable versions of Debian. The results of our analysis can therefore not be generalized to other base images in Docker. The analysis itself, however, can be easily replicated on other base images.
We chose to use the technical lag as a measurement. We only compared the used package version with latest available version of the package within the same Debian release. Our results may differ when comparing with the latest available package versions from the latest (e.g., Stable, Testing or Unstable) Debian releases.
Moreover, it is not trivial to identify which package versions are affected by bugs or severity vulnerabilities. For example, the way in which we computed vulnerabilities and bugs was different. For vulnerabilities we relied only on the fixed version, since this is the way it is done in companies such as CoreOS or Anchore.io. For bugs, we relied on two sources of information: the bug report creation date and its last modification date. Counting bugs in the same way as vulnerabilities would result in more bugs than the ones considered in this analysis.
Also, when searching for vulnerabilities in the Debian security tracker, the debianbug id was not found for 38% of the vulnerability reports. This may have influenced our survival analysis results. However, the missing proportion of vulnerability reports is responsible for only 7% of all analyzed container vulnerabilities.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented an empirical analysis of the state of packages in public Docker containers that are based on the Linux-based Debian distribution. We studied how outdated container packages are and how this relates to the presence of bugs and severity vulnerabilities.
Considering both official and community images, we studied 7,380 popular unique images. We observed that most container packages have the latest fix available in Debian, even for old packages (e.g., Stable). However, we found that all containers have vulnerable and buggy packages. Studying outdated packages in more detail, we found that their number is correlated with the number of vulnerabilities found in a container.
We observed that in Debian, taking care of security vulnerabilities is more important than taking care of bugs. This results a high number of open bugs for the Stable and Oldstable releases. Therefore, even up-to-date installed package versions could be affected by these open bugs.
These findings indicate that container deployers whose major concerns are stability and security need to rely on better updating procedures. In contrast, container deployers that care more about functionality and bugs should rely on the newest Debian releases.
When studying how outdated Docker images are, we did not differentiate between specific package characteristics such as their size, service, targeted audience, or provided functionality. Moreover, we did not differentiate between release types (e.g., patch, minor or major) when calculating technical lag. In future work we would like to consider other measures of technical lag while considering package characteristics and all available releases in a project. For instance, in many cases vulnerability fixes are first done in the Testing or Unstable releases before entering the Stable and Oldstable releases.
Besides the operating system packages, containers have other types of packages installed on them, for instance, PyPI and npm packages. Such packages can be vulnerable as well [8] , [13] , [15] . Thus, we aim to include these other types of packages. We also plan to carry out a comparison with other operating systems and other base images.
Since our data extraction and analysis are automated, we aim to create a tool that automatically gathers and analyses package information, such as package vulnerabilities, bugs, possible updates, possible conflicts, dependencies, etc., for different operating systems. To be able to analyze their evolution, we also aim to gather monthly snapshots about the Docker containers content and state. Finally, we want to carry out surveys and interviews with container deployers to validate the implication of our work, collect more insights about common practices, and build models to recommend updates to container deployers.
